University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Reviews

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Review of Understanding Labor and Employment Law in China, by
Ronald C.Brown
Nicholas C. Howson

University of Michigan School of Law, nhowson@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/113

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legal
History Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Howson, Nicholas C. Review of Understanding Labor and Employment Law in China, by Ronald C.Brown.
Law & Pol. Bk. Rev. 20, no. 8 (2010): 319-28.

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Vol. 20 No. 8 (August, 2010) pp.319-328
UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA, by Ronald C.
Brown. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 348pp. Hardback $90.00/£50.00.
ISBN: 9780521191487. eBook format $72.00. ISBN: 9780511636813.
Reviewed by Nicholas Calcina Howson, Michigan Law School. Email: nhowson@umich.edu.
Any attempt to analyze China’s
comprehensive labor reform over the past
three decades faces at least two dilemmas.
First, the analyst must confront the task of
describing how the Chinese state has
dismantled the “work unit” (or danwei)based “iron rice bowl” employment and
entitlements system, replacing that
comforting but low-production
employment and social security scheme
with formally-proclaimed legal rights and
institutions apparently designed to protect
employees in a functioning labor market.
Second, the analyst must track how the
state’s commitment (at all levels of
government) to implementation of
proclaimed legal and institutional
protections has waxed and waned, based
upon two China-specific factors: (i) the
age-old dysfunction between formallyproclaimed legal norms and concrete
application of those norms generally, or
against superior political or economic
power specifically; and (ii) the ongoing
deference to a national development
policy that puts accelerating economic
growth before legal, civil and political
rights (where achieved growth is meant to
complement the appearance of rule of law
in ensuring political stability and some
measure of the “harmonious society”)
(Gallagher 2005; Lee 2007; Anderson
2010).
University of Hawaii law professor
Ronald C. Brown’s new volume,
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UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA, is a
diligent attempt to catalogue the abundant
formal labor-related law and legal
institutions established since the mid1980s with a particular focus on the
period 1992-2008. In assembling a work
like UNDERSTANDING LABOR, the
scholar has several options, which are not
mutually exclusive: exposition of formal
norms and institutions, implementation
data collection, and analysis. Professor
Brown has opted strongly for the first,
and offers a wide-ranging exposition
divided into major sections describing (i)
formal labor regulation and government
administration, (ii) employment
relationships (focusing on individual
labor contracts under the newlypromulgated Labor Contract Law, but
with some attention to the notionally
available “collective” labor contract (not
to be confused with collective
bargaining)), (iii) hiring and employment
practices (focusing on discrimination in
hiring), (iv) wages and occupational
safety and health; (v) benefits; and (vi)
labor discipline and dispute resolution.
That exposition is accomplished in 186
pages of a 323 page book, with the
remainder filled out by 11 pages of “case
illustrations,” 42 pages of a sample
individual “Labor Contract” from 2008
and the “Model Collective Contract (for
Trial Implementation)” issued in
December 2007 by the Beijing
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Federation of Trade Unions, and then a
final section of 69 pages reproducing
translations of important statutes,
including: the Labor Law of the PRC, the
Labor Contract Law, Implementing
Regulations for the Labor Contract Law,
the Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law, and the Employment
Promotion Law of the PRC. Thus,
UNDERSTANDING LABOR is largely
an assembled exposition of legal and
regulatory structures applied to labor in
the contemporary PRC to 2008, prefacing
more than 100 pages of English language
translations of model contracts and
statutory material. The exposition and
summary of norms is voluminous, and
straightforward. For example, Chapter 4
(“Individual Labor Contracts Formation
and Content”), has a total of 62 footnotes,
all but 10 of which refer to the specific
articles of the Labor Contract Law which
the text re-states; six pages (pp.55-61) of
Chapter 5’s Section 3 (“Current Law on
Collective Negotiations”) carry 77
footnotes in each case citing to the
specific articles in the Provisions on
Collective Contacts and the Trade Union
Law reported in the text; Chapter 14 is a
straight text presentation of the articles in
the 2007 Labor Mediation Law.
A strategy of exposition, without much
implementation data or real analysis, is
not to be dismissed out of hand. A text
reporting on a given area of law and
practice could be intended as a kind of
“desk book,” or reference work for
practicing lawyers or introductory-level
investigators. Of course, the exposition
provided should be up to date, relatively
complete, accurate, and attempt to
prioritize important (applied) structures
over rhetorical or formal designs.
From The Law and Politics Book Review
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Moreover, a book of straight exposition
should strive to avoid becoming a law firm
“client alert” memorandum describing a
new regulatory enactment but devoid of
current data, analysis of the system in place,
or any report on actual implementation. It is
with respect to these desired aspects that
UNDERSTANDING LABOR fails to fully
conform to its promise. A good deal of the
data that is included: seems outdated (e.g.,
a World Bank study from 2004 reported by
journalists, a 2004 report by Simon Clarke,
Chang-Hee Lee and Li Qi (“Clarke
Report”), a 2003 study by Bill Taylor,
Chang Kai and Li Qi (“Taylor Study”), data
on labor arbitration ending in 2007 (pp.169,
172)); is sourced only in English language
materials (e.g., the China Daily or the now
defunct Far Eastern Economic Review); or
taken from “official” publications like the
notoriously unreliable China Daily and the
(English language text of) CHINA
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. (The
YEARBOOK is regarded with some
suspicion by China scholars, and is notable
for substantive differences between the
English and Chinese language text
presentations of the same data.) In the
places where there is a hint of analysis,
UNDERSTANDING LABOR relies very
heavily on older studies. For example,
Chapter 5, entitled “Collective Labor
Contracts and Collective Negotiations,” is
in one section (pp.49-53) a regurgitation of
the Clarke Report and the Taylor Study.
Moreover, the book is thin on any
description or consideration of the
significant and very public policy
disputes over labor law, and in particular
the Labor Contract Law, between well
known figures like Professor Chang Kai of
China People’s University and East China
University of Politics and Law’s
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Dong Baohua. These debates, carried on
in the popular press, academic
monographs, and via labor arbitration and
litigation, or public relations strategies,
are largely in the Chinese language but
also accessible in English translation
(e.g., Blanpain, Bisom-Rapp, Corbett,
Josephs and Zimmer 2007: 510-514
(excerpted interview with Professor
Chang), and the Taylor Report referred to
by Professor Brown (at least with respect
to the views of Professor Chang Kai)). It
is also an exercise in
intellectual/legislative history commonly
provided for other equally complex areas
of legal development, such as: an earlier
identity of labor law in the PRC (Josephs
1995), China’s intellectual property law
(Alford 1995: 56-82), U.S. securities
regulation (Seligman 2003), U.S. antitrust law (Urofsky 2009: 300-326, 342351), corporate fiduciary duties in
Japanese law (Kanda and Milhaupt 2003),
PRC marriage law (Alford 2003) and
even China’s amended Company Law
(Howson 2008: 200-206, 208-213). The
straight exposition of China’s labor laws
and regulations in most cases passed
suddenly and with little transparency
regarding drafting choices made inside
the National People’s Congress or the
governing Ministry would be greatly
enhanced by some recitation of these
important, and ongoing, debates. This is
particularly true in the case of the Labor
Contract Law, which was the subject of
impassioned public debate inside the
PRC, elite and popular. The book also
regrettably omits any real discussion of
the labor law and regulatory system
applied first and exclusively in the
foreign-invested enterprise (“FIE”)
context, which dates from more than 15
years before the promulgation of a PRC
From The Law and Politics Book Review
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Labor Law in 1994. Without doubt, the
PRC’s experience with new labor markets
and FIEs since the early 1980s has
determined the shape and application of the
labor regulatory system now applicable to
purely domestically invested enterprises.
The truth of this statement is made apparent
in Professor Brown’s brief treatment of
“illustrative cases” noted below, all five of
which seem to refer to employment
disputes at such FIEs or foreign enterprises.
From a law and legal institutions
perspective, UNDERSTANDING LABOR
gives too little attention to the peculiarities
governing the meaning and effect of
Chinese law and regulation. Professor
Brown starts in a promising way, asserting
that “[the way in which] Chinese laws
operate is surprising to many in the West”
(p.5). He then deviates immediately to
focus on the much discussed central-local
issue in Chinese governance for a sentence
or two, and never returns to how “Chinese
laws operate.” Instead, any complete
evaluation of the formal legal order must
show how its application is determined by
the widely-accepted non-implementation
and instrumentalism of the developing
Chinese legal system, and the over-riding
force of what Perry Keller calls “normative
documents” (Keller 1994) or administrative
regulation (Clarke 1997), over and above
“law” or national regulation. (For instance,
Professor Brown makes reference to the
recently-issued Labor Contract Law
Implementing Regulations, but fails to
describe how as is the case in almost any
sector of regulation in the PRC such
apparently subordinate “implementing
regulations” baldly contravene the
provisions of what is supposed to be a
superior norm, the “Law” itself.) The
problem is
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exacerbated by the relative lack of data in
UNDERSTANDING LABOR regarding
concrete application of formal norms,
whether by regulatory institutions, or
private claims and/or dispute resolution
proceedings. An approach which lays out
in easy-to-digest form official norms and
institutional structures risks engendering
a misapprehension on the part of the
uninformed reader: that rules are in fact
applied as written or that institutions
function as described. Even where data is
provided, its real meaning can be
obscured without the appropriate context.
For example, in Chapter 14 (“Resolving
Labor Disputes by Mediation, Arbitration
and Litigation”), Professor Brown
celebrates the “accessibility” (p.168)
under statute of labor mediation (firm
internal) and labor arbitration (firm
external, but extra-legal), and reports the
huge spike in, for example, labor
arbitration cases in China (3000%
between 1989 and 2007, and a 50%
increase in case acceptances over the
same period between 2007 and 2008).
While the author also points out that
arbitration is mandatory before legal
action, he does not emphasize the way in
which various PRC state institutions at all
levels via notices and regulatory
measures overwhelmingly push civil
parties into mediation before arbitration,
and explicitly so as to keep such
provocative disputes away from formal
legal institutions. This push into
mediation results in a compromise
settlement where employer (with
significantly greater leverage) and
employee both win a little and lose a
little, and employees enjoy something
much less than pure rights protection or
adequate monitoring of oppressive
employers. This is the reality of a stateFrom The Law and Politics Book Review
Vol. 20 No. 8 (August 2010)

guided labor rights protection regime, and
is at variance with what formal norms seem
to allow or provide “access” to. Knowing
this, readers might comprehend with greater
insight a passage like the following (p.172),
and the meaning of such terms as
“resolving cases,” “settled,” “withdrawal,”
“rejection,” “workers prevailed,” “split
decisions” and “partial victories”:
“Labor arbitration has proven quite
successful in resolving cases; the
resolution rate is higher than 92 percent,
including conciliation/mediation and
arbitration awards, which in 2006 were 34
and 46 percent of the total settlements,
respectively. Of a total of 310,780 cases
filed and settled in the arbitration process,
104,435 cases were mediated, whereas
141,465 were settled by arbitration. The
other 20 percent were dispensed with by
withdrawals, rejections, and the like.
Workers prevailed in 146,028 cases,
employers in 39,251, and there were split
decisions in 125,501 cases . . . . Statistics
show workers win nearly four cases for
every one by the employer and win partial
victories in a majority of the split
decisions.”

Moreover, a recitation of statistics like this
(in this case, drawn from the 2006 CHINA
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK) says
nothing about enforcement of the
“settlements” or “awards,” or the fate of
employees who have lost or won alleged
“partial” victories.
A related difficulty is the way in which
UNDERSTANDING LABOR fails in
addressing substantive matters of labor law
and regulation. An example is the
formalized treatment of employee benefits
in Chapter 11 (pp.135-147), which lists
what law or regulation describes as
mandatory or elective benefits for labor,
proclaiming “X law
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provides…” or “insurance is financed . .
.”, without any real indication of the truth,
or record of non-implementation or lack
of financing, which lies behind the formal
edifice. And, as noted above, this
information is available in the English
language, with better data, a more honest
sense of the difference between
proclaimed and implemented norms, and
remarkably fearless analysis (e.g., with
respect to social security, see Gao 2008
(written by Gao Xiqing when still Vice
Chairman of the National Council for
Social Security Fund Council, before
being appointed President and Chief
Investment Officer of the China
Investment Corporation, the PRC’s most
significant sovereign wealth fund)).
Also doubtful is the wisdom of including
more than 50 pages of “illustrative
contracts,” which section includes (i) an
“Individual Employment Contract”
(“used in the manufacturing industry in
2008” per the notes before the form
provided), and (ii) the Beijing Municipal
Federation of Trade Unions December
2007 “Model Collective Contract (for
Trial Implementation).” Of course, it is
beneficial for the English language reader
to have an idea of what modern PRC
contracts look like in translation.
However, the existence of promulgated
form contracts in China, and their
celebration, may be problematic. Very
often such model forms are stilted,
article-by-article, “contractual”
elaborations of statutory or regulatory
norms which work against the rightsenabling/self-ordering ethos which
animate the very idea of a labor
“contract.” As seen in the “model”
contracts foisted on apparently
autonomous civil actors in land use rights
From The Law and Politics Book Review
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transactions, corporate articles of
association and capitalization structures,
resource exploration and development,
technology transfer and licensing, and
numerous other fields of endeavor, the risk
is that such model forms will be viewed
by contracting parties and approving
government institutions alike as
mandatory, the very opposite of selfdetermined bargains between independent
civil actors. It is appropriate for Professor
Brown to allude to the proliferation of such
“model” forms; it is a mistake however to
dedicate a good part of his volume to
translations of this material, especially with
the risk that practitioners in China will look
to such forms as the mandatory framework
for memorialization of what are supposed
to be negotiated arrangements.
UNDERSTANDING LABOR does contain
10 pages of “illustrations” (in the chapter
called “Working Labor Law and
Employment Law Illustrations” (with
introductory material, pp.187-199)). This
section is useful, if atrophied given the
volume of data and reported decisions now
available through public sources and
academic or journalistic interviewing. In
fact, only five cases are addressed, all
appear to involve FIEs or foreigners
working in China, and all come from law
firm memoranda or foreign language press
accounts or blogs (one case is not sourced,
and appears to be a hypothetical “… the
legal issues of a foreign person working in
China who is both under contract with a
foreign-based, home country employer and
under contract with a China-based
corporation” (pp.194-5)). In only one of the
cases is the ex post legal reasoning
described (non-retroactive application of
the Labor Contract Law); in one other case,
the reasoning supporting the
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judgment (a court order by the Donghu
District People’s Court in Nanchang
Municipality) is absent. This small
section (at pp.196-7) also demonstrates a
substantive misunderstanding of labor
and employment relationships between
foreign entity “representative offices” in
the PRC, and China-domiciled FIEs.
Representative offices are not permitted
to enter into employment relationships
with citizens of the PRC (instead such
offices use individuals “seconded” to the
representative office by the de jure
employer, a PRC employment service
company). Only FIEs, legal entities
domiciled in the PRC, are permitted to
enter into direct employment
relationships with PRC citizens. Foreigndomiciled entities are not permitted to
sign employment agreements with PRC
citizens. This hypothetical illustration,
and the invocation of applicable legal
norms, should be restructured so as to
clarify the important issues involved.
Finally, the book contains a number of
spelling mistakes, and, more importantly,
mis-steps in translation from Chinese or
renderings of Chinese terms into
indicative English. The English typos and
inconsistencies (e.g., “Ministry of uman
Resources and Society Security” (p.13
(emphasis added)) and “Labor Low of the
People’s Republic of China” (p.253
(emphasis added); “Corporation Law”
(p.46) and “Company Law” (p.47) for the
same statute) could be remedied by an
attentive copy editor. Their prominence,
and abundance, detracts from the overall
authority of the volume. In many cases,
Professor Brown or the translator uses
PRC government-style translations of
terms into English, which obscure in
some measure the norm or institution
From The Law and Politics Book Review
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described. For instance, the Ministry of
Labor’s “xuanchuan zhongxin” or
“Propaganda Center” is translated as the
Ministry’s “Publicity Center” (p.16). The
phenomenon “laowu paiqian” is rendered
as the benign-sounding “worker dispatch
service.” The issue with the first translation
is obvious. The issue with the second is
more subtle. While “laowu paiqian” may
literally be rendered “labor services
dispatch,” the term refers to one of the most
controversial and oppression-ripe
arrangements currently at work in the PRC:
employee aggregation and provision
pursuant to group (mass) contracted labor
arrangements. Not only are these structures
rife with opportunity for individual labor
rights deprivation, but they skew or
eliminate legal privity between “employer”
and (real) “employee.” Surely even the
simple term “contract labor provider” is
preferable to the anodyne “worker dispatch
service”?
Most important in a work which aspires to
be a reference book is the accuracy of the
translations of Chinese laws and
regulations. Here the problems identified in
UNDERSTANDING LABOR can be
significant, as the translations often prove
unreliable or incomplete. By way of
example, in this review I focus only on the
English translation provided for the allimportant “Labor Contract Law” effective
January 1, 2008. Some of the translation
choices indicate a lack of familiarity with
the background of China’s developing
economic and political structures, and the
supporting legal system. For instance, the
Chinese characters “minban” modifying
one kind of legal entity are translated as
“private” (Article 2), where the far better
English language
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concept is “non-state” to capture
collectively-owned enterprises and their
progeny (which are not “private”).
Likewise, for the doctrinal term
“chengshi xinyong” (Article 3) applied to
the formation of labor contracts, the
translation is simply “good faith” instead
of “overwhelming good faith [and fair
dealing]” derived from the long-standing
Roman law concept of uberima fides
transplanted into Article 4 of the PRC’s
General Principles of the Civil Law. This
may seem a small lapse, but U.S. style
“good faith” (as, for instance, required in
partnership law) is quite different from
uberima fides/overwhelming good faith
as an instruction to any ex post arbitral or
judicial decision-maker in his or her
evaluation of labor contract formation. As
shown in my own work with respect to
corporate fiduciary litigation in China,
this string of four Chinese characters
taken from a rich civil law tradition is
used by the Chinese People’s Courts as a
vehicle to apply extremely broad notions
of fairness, transparency and loyalty to
void oppressive contracts (Howson
2010), just as the broad notion of “rights
infringement” (qinquan) does similar
work in torts, contract, securities and
fraud adjudication. Finally, there are
significant omissions in the translated
statute. For instance, Article 5 of the
Labor Contract Law gives the local
government authorities the power to
“investigate and solve” (yanjiu jiejue)
significant labor relations issues
(emphasis added). The investigation
power is of critical importance in
determining the real facts of labor rights
infringement in the PRC, especially in the
face of all-powerful state or Party-owned
employers. However, the
UNDERSTANDING LABOR translation
From The Law and Politics Book Review
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omits the authority for “investigation” and
simply says that the government, along with
the labor union and employer’s
representative, shall jointly seek “to solve
the major problems related to employment
relations” (p.271). (Perhaps this same
omission accounts for the reference to a
2004 administrative regulation allowing
investigation by local labor bureaus instead
of the Law (see p.188, footnote 5).) A
second example is more serious. Almost
every law governing activity in and
regarding the PRC contains a jurisdictional
clause, proclaiming jurisdiction over
activities, transactions, legal relationships,
etc.: “in the territory of the PRC”
(emphasis added). This term of art
formulation “territory” is necessary so that
PRC law does not cover activities and
relationships in regions understood to be
part of the PRC but not subject to PRC law,
i.e., the Hong Kong and Macao Special
Administrative Regions, and the “Province”
of Taiwan. The Chinese form of Article 2
of the Labor Contract Law accordingly
describes the application of the Law to
“zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei de”
employer entities properly translated as
“entities… within the territory of the PRC.”
The translation of Article 2 of the Law
provided in UNDERSTANDING LABOR,
however, renders this article as “This Law
shall apply to the establishment of an
employment relationship between
employees and enterprises…” and
completely drops the subsequent modifying
verbiage “within the territory of the PRC.”
Thus, the non-Chinese-reading lawyer or
scholar consulting the English translation of
this critically important Law might come
away believing that the Law governs
employment relationships in Hong

325

Kong, Macao or Taiwan! This is not
correct, and as a threshold mistake could
prove profoundly misleading.
How might a good first effort like
UNDERSTANDING LABOR be
restructured or expanded to offer a more
useful and analytical work? First, an
author would describe the status quo ante
of pre-reform labor administration and
“cradle to grave” security, where law and
regulation, and legal institutions, had no
role whatsoever. Second, readers require
a stronger roadmap of the economic
structural reforms implemented since
1980, in particular the way in which the
“Socialist market economy” gave rise to
something very close to real (and
completely unregulated) labor markets in
the PRC. Third, a similar, coherent,
treatment of the general legal construction
(called “legal reform” in English
language writing) program implemented
over three decades would be useful, with
a special focus on the nature of law and
regulation in modern China, its largely
instrumental character, and the substitute
governance norms and institutions that
actually function. Fourth, the analyst
would make an effort to describe the
labor law and regulatory norms put in
place with the advent of foreign direct
investment and FIEs established in China
such initial norms being models for
much of what followed in the purely
domestic context. Fifth would be the
exposition that Professor Brown engages
in, but in a more pointed fashion, and
without the large volume of writing
which paraphrases English translations of
proclaimed statutory and regulatory
norms. Sixth, the author would attempt to
introduce some of the now abundant data
regarding labor markets, regulation,
dispute resolution (mediation, arbitration,
From The Law and Politics Book Review
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litigation), enforcement, and rights
protection in the PRC (including exercise
of private rights of action at law, and
political resistance in the streets). Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the author
would ask some very hard questions by way
of analysis, such as: What purpose do
formal legal and regulatory norms really
serve in the modern PRC, especially in a
highly sensitive, social control-related, and
personal rights-oriented sphere like that of
labor relations and labor rights? How are
capital-labor relations really governed in
today’s China? Are there regional or
sectoral or organizational variances in the
way labor is governed throughout the large
and diverse nation? What is the strength
and effect of the alternative governance
norms and institutions which actually work
today? To what extent will disillusionment
with formal structures offered for comfort
and consumption by laborers fuel
disillusionment with legal and regulatory
systems generally, or fire ever-exploding
“rights consciousness” among China’s
governed? Or, to what extent will
governing elites be forced to deliver on the
promise of proclaimed norms and
institutions, lest they face political
resistance born of private actors (laborers)
seeking justice or simple remedies? What is
the effect of labor regulation directed at
export oriented FIEs established in coastal
areas on purely domestic enterprises,
export-oriented or not? Other analysts and
scholars have accomplished precisely this
with respect to various areas of inquiry, for
instance with respect to the development of
copyright law (Alford 1995),
corporatization, commercial banking
reform and regulation (Lardy 1998),
corporate law and corporate governance
(Tenev, Zhang and Brefort
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2002), China’s stock exchanges and
capital markets (Greene 2003; Walter and
Howie 2003), and a slightly earlier
generation of labor law reform (Josephs
2003). There is no reason why the same
kind of exposition, introduction of data,
analysis and forecast cannot be
accomplished in the even more data-rich
and well-observed contemporary labor
sector of China. Professor Brown’s book
is a good faith first draft of the necessary
effort to understand labor law and
regulation in China. As such, it should
and will inspire further work detailing
concrete implementation (or not) of the
formal system, and analysis of its
meaning for China’s workers, for the
nation’s modern governance project, and
for the fate of the PRC’s thirty year
struggle to establish rule of (not by) law.
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